Russians rely heavily on artillery and MLRS rockets to bombard an enemy. In addition, Russian tanks often did not chase retreating troops more than 30 kilometers before turning back. This is further evidence of tank deployment risk-aversion and over-reliance on artillery and proxy infantry. Even the tanks Russia used to support the final approach were only brought up when all other options were exhausted and the separatists had cleared enough of the structures to guarantee the tanks’ safety. Without these light infantry, even armored forces were unable to overcome the city’s defenders. For example, the Russian regulars involved in the attack to capture Mariupol in Ukraine were operating without the level of paramilitary support they enjoyed in the eastern parts of Donbas Province. As far as Russian tank tactics are concerned, we discuss some tactical vulnerabilities of the Russian battalion tactical groups (BTG). We included a description of the types of ammunition (and number of rounds) Russian tanks carry and how quickly the autoloader can load the next round. The book includes specifications such as how thick the armor is on the top of a T-72 tank and what type of explosive armor has been installed on the different tanks. This book describes the major variants used by the Russian military. The Soviets (and now the Russians) produced so many variants of tanks (including for export) in the last fifty years that it would be impossible to include them all in one book. Included are diagrams showing the vulnerable locations of specific Russian armored vehicles. The Chechens took advantage of some built-in vulnerabilities in Russian hardware they were very familiar with since most Chechens had served in the Russian military. The tactics they used were very effective at destroying or disabling Russian armor especially in an urban setting. Basically it talks about the ways the Chechens were able to knock out Russian tanks and armored vehicles. I added 4 pages from a report written by Lester Grau titled " Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience.
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